BISMARCK AND DISRAELI:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POWER
by
William R. Daniels, Jr.
Copyright © 1974 by William R. Daniels, Jr.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER ONE: THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN PRUSSIA
AND ENGLAND
2
CHAPTER TWO: BISMARCK'S ATTEMPTS TO SECURE HIS POSITION 6
CHAPTER THREE: DISRAELI'S RISE TO POWER, HIS
LITERATURE, POLITICAL THEORIES
AND PARLIAMENTARY CAREER
10
CHAPTER FOUR: BISMARCK'S CONDUCT AS A STATESMAN 15
CHAPTER FIVE: DISRAELI AS A STATESMAN 22
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 33
FOOTNOTES 37
BIBLIOGRAPHY
47
INTRODUCTION
Two men, through their personalities and their actions, dominated the European political arena for the last half of the nineteenth century. One of them was Otto von Bismarck, Minister-President of Prussia from 1862 to 1871, and Chancellor of the German Empire from 1871 to 1890; the other man was Benjamin Disraeli, who served as Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1868, and again in the years from 1874 to 1880.
Both of these notable men were politicians of conservative persuasion; both men became highly respected diplomats; and both men were confronted with similar foreign and domestic obstacles.
In my attempt to analyze the careers of both of these men, I feel that it is necessary for me to examine the political context from which they rose to the pinnacle of fame and power. The political institutions of England and Prussia were quite different, as well as the prevailing political mood of both respective nations.
Therefore, the account which I will present will be an analysis of the
political conditions which each man faced in his respective nation; I will
also attempt to convey what I believe to be the motives, the principles,
and the forces which shaped these men's minds and the manner in which they
acted.
CHAPTER ONE
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN PRUSSIA AND ENGLAND
As one noted historian, Otto Pflanze, has said of Bismarck, "As important as the man himself were the many forces- social, political, intellectual, and institutional- which shaped his environment and with which he dealt." 1
If there are differences between the political situation of nineteenth century Prussia and that of other European nations, they may be ascribed to the following three factors:
1. First, as a result of the French Revolution of 1789 and the subsequent French occupation of Prussia, most Prussians had come to regard the French and their liberal ideas with an ever-increasing enmity. Such attitudes, when harbored for lengthy periods with such fierce hatred, became embedded in Prussian political thinking. The consequent result was that most Prussians came to associate ALL liberal ideas with their hatred for the French. 2
2. The second reason involves the extent of economic development in Prussia at the time of Bismarck's accession to power. In 1862, Prussia was still a relatively poor country, and what little industry she had was mostly small handicraft operations.3 Consequently, the small "bourgeoisie in Germany was neither as wealthy nor as concentrated as in
France and England." 4 In most European countries during the first half of the nineteenth century (primarily, France and England), governmental reforms and the rise of liberalism had been linked to the existence of a large, prosperous, ever-advancing bourgeoisie.5 Thus, if one combines the lack of a bourgeoisie in Prussia with the effects that the French Revolution produced upon Prussian political thought, one may assume that liberal doctrines never had the chance to take hold and produce change in Prussia as they had in other areas of Europe.
3. Thirdly, there is the all-important fact that, upon his appointment, Bismarck was directly responsible only to the King of Prussia, and not to any parliamentary body. 1
The circumstances which existed in Prussia upon Bismarck's appointment in t862 may also help to explain how King William I of Prussia became so dependent upon his Minister. Prior to his appointment, both conservative and liberal factions were making demands upon the government which the King did not feel that he could grant. A complex domestic situation threatened to blossom into civil war, with the result that the future of the Prussian monarchy was endangered . Bismarck's first task as a Minister was to protect the Prussian monarchy and preserve its independence, he succeeded in doing so by defying the Prussian National Assembly, and by employing war as a means whereby he could fan the flames of those who desired German unification, thus diverting the domestic political opposition to the government.
Some historians now believe that the situation in Prussia in 1862 was so critical that only a politician employing such methods as Bismarck could have circumvented the liberal majority in the parliament. 6 Some historians even credit Bismarck as being the sole man with enough gall to suppress all opposition to the government by imposing censorship and curtailing the activities of many Prussian citizens, including the liberally-minded Crown Prince.7 The mere fact that Bismarck succeeded in protecting the institution of the Prussian monarchy earned him the unending admiration of King William. He made himself indispensable to the King to such an extent that the King found himself backing down and accommodating his beliefs with those of his Minister, Bismarck was too important, too necessary a tool, for the King to feel comfortable in his absence.
Thus, the power of an authoritarian monarchy was transferred to a Minister who was theoretically responsible to his Sovereign, but who, in practice, was responsible to no one. For all practical purposes, Otto von Bismarck wielded absolute power in Prussia and Germany during the years 1862-1890.
The political institutions in England provide quite a contrast to those of Prussia. Since the times of the Glorious Revolution and the Civil War. a system of ministerial accountability and the supremacy of a popularly elected parliament had developed; by the nineteenth century, the English political climate was steeped in traditions and precedents.
Although England had a Sovereign who was theoretically the Head of State, the balance of the powers of state lay heavily in the hands of Parliament. A ministerial system had evolved, whereby the Crown's ministers were directly responsible to the Parliament, in Parliament, various factions joined together to form political parties so that, by the nineteenth century, England had a parliamentary government with a constitutional monarch.
Economically, England was one of the most prosperous nations in Europe;
she was a massive industrial state with a largest concentrated bourgeoisie.
As a result of liberal reforms and the increasing voter franchise, the
bourgeoisie were beginning to have a great 'influence
upon the composition of the membership of the House of Commons. 8 Liberal
policies were discussed and implemented in England, and some degree of
popular sovereignty was beginning to develop.
This was the situation through which a young Benjamin Disraeli would come forth andt after distinguishing himself in Parliamentary debate, gain the leadership of the Conservative Party in Parliament. He was to work within the system; when he became Prime Minister, he was not the inventor, but rather the holder of a position which had already been moulded by his predecessors. Unlike Bismarck, he did not create the political, institutions in which he would serve, he was not a man whose position as Prime Minister made him independent of his colleagues, but, a man whose position made it necessary for him to compromise and take other's opinions and abilities into account. Whereas a Bismarck wielded absolute power, a Disraeli in England was bound by tradition, party affiliation, Parliamentary accountability, and an ultimate responsibility to the British electorate.
Disraeli's approach to government is described in the following manner:
A Minister under a Constitutional Monarchy such as prevails in this
country owes to a certain extent a divided allegiance. He is at once a
servant of the Crown and a servant of the people. He has a duty to the
permanent Head of the British Empire. who appoints, and appoints him sometimes
with a real liberty of selection, and who has the power in the last resort
to dismiss him , subject to the ratification of his act by the people through
Parliament: where he cannot maintain his position unless he can command
the support, or at least the toleration, of a majority of the House of
Commons. As this country becomes increasingly democratised, there is a
tendency to dwell almost exclusively upon the last mentioned duty, and
to ignore, at least minimize, the first. Disraeli never forgot that, if
he was a servant of the people, he was also the Minister of his Sovereign.9
CHAPTER TWO
BISMARCK'S ATTEMPTS TO SECURE HIS POSITION
If Disraeli was tied to a constitutional, parliamentary type of government, Otto von Bismarck came to power with no limitations imposed on his position. He was a man who, from his earliest days, was "driven by a dynamic urge to lead and dominate."10 He was responsible only to the King, who had appointed him, there was no ministerial accountability, the parliament had no real power of the purse, and it had no way to call the King's Minister to account for his policies and actions. 11
Since he had assumed office during a constitutional crisis between the King and the parliament, Bismarck's first task was to remedy the impasse. Prior to his assumption of office, he had already determined the domestic and foreign policies which he would pursue. His "step by step" objectives were:
1. To gain the support of the King and the army;
2. To temper the liberal opposition by allying with them; and,
3. To pursue a foreign policy which united the German peoples. 12
The primary technique which Bismarck employed to achieve these three goals was his use of war; it is also probable that his consideration of domestic affairs was relegated, temporarily, to a secondary position behind that of foreign policy. 13
However, when Bismarck commented that "great crises are the very weather which stimulates Prussia's growth..." 14 Many historians suspect that the great Iron Chancellor created these crises in order that he could control his domestic opposition and secure his own position in the government.15 These historians also maintain that, not only did Bismarck desire a conflict with Denmark over the possession of the Schleswig-Holstein provinces in 1864, but that he also deliberately manufactured the Hohenzollern candidature for the throne of Spain as a "trap set for Napoleon". 16
If Bismarck's foreign policy was connected with his domestic policy, any attempt to channel the Prussian populace's hatred for France into action would result in a broadening of the government's base of support; any hostile action which he could direct against France would also serve to allay his domestic opposition. Quite possibly, then, Bismarck's direction of foreign policy was guided by his consideration of the favorable effects which it would produce on the domestic scene. It appears that all of Bismarck's foreign plans were designed to prepare Prussia for war against France, and that his rather moderate objectives in the war against Austria in 1867 were purposely limited in order that Austria might be induced to remain neutral when the time came for war against France.17
Some historians do not believe that Bismarck liked war, noting that the little opposition that Bismarck faced came primarily from the military, they maintain that he wished to avoid war because "it deprived him of control and left the decisions to generals whose ability he distrusted." 18
However, others allege that he would not hesitate to use war as a weapon in which he could maintain his personal position. In assessing this charge, we should first note, in full context, the specific meaning of the words which he delivered in his first speech before the Prussian National Assembly:
Prussia must build up and preserve her strength for the favorable moment, which has already come and gone many times. Her borders under the Treaty of Vienna are not favorable to the healthy existence of the state. The great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions- that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849- but by blood and iron.19
This indicates Bismarck's awareness to the fact that German unification could be achieved in such a way as to be extremely favorable, not only to the Prussian state and King William. but also to the position which he himself could continue to hold in such a united state. It is possible to point out that, after the victory in the first war with Denmark in 1864, Bismarck's political position in Prussia was made more secure. He was able to present the Schleswig-Holstein provinces to the Prussian National Assembly. simultaneously asking for their pardon for his illegal dispersement of military appropriations which they had not approved. It was impossible for the liberal Assembly to condemn the man who had just acquired new territory for Prussia, and had earned her an increased amount of prestige through victory on the battlefield. Thus, by appealing to their admiration for his success in foreign policy and war, Bismarck was able to be rid of the parliamentary opposition which had been aligned against him.
Two more wars followed the one with Denmark. The first ones the war against Austria in 1867, saw the establishment of the North German Confederation, and the annexation of several north German province to Prussia; for this consolidation and movement toward unification, King William felt himself forever indebted to his Minister.
The last of the three wars of unification was the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. The results of this war gave two--French provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, to Prussia; the abundant quantities of coal and iron ore which were found in these provinces assured Prussia of continued industrial expansion. This war also caused the absorption of the south German provinces into the German Empire, thereby completing German unification as Bismarck had envisioned it. 20
In each of the three cases, the wars benefitted not only the Prussian nation, but also Bismarck's personal standing in the government. Maintaining his position was, of course, a thing to be most desired by Bismarck; therefore, any assessment of his actions in the field of foreign affairs must take into consideration the fact that the Minister was always conscious of the necessity of making himself indispensable to the King.
His successes in war made Bismarck a national hero; after all, it was he who personally directed the successful completion of the long-desired Ger man unification. Having previously noted that Bismarck's foreign policy was probably rooted in his desire to divert liberal, domestic opposition, the mere fact that he was now a national hero further enabled him to defy all opposition to himself, and to impose his will on the King, the Reichstag and the German people. 21
As if all of this was not enough to make the man secure in his position, the new constitution which established the German Empire was totally his "creation"; 22 the position of Chancellor was specifically tailored and contoured for himself; and the new institutions of government, such as the Federal Council and the Reichstag, were deliberately left without much power. As Chancellor, Bismarck continued to be unaccountable to anyone except the King who had the power of appointing him and dismissing him; however, the real powers of state were concentrated in the hands of the Chancellor. 23 The Reichstag was given the right to determine expenditure, but not to control revenue. 24 As one historian says& "The constitution was a compromise between anatagonistic interests, intended to reduce conflict to a minimum- between Empire and sovereign State, princely rights and parliamentary rights, new claims and old traditions..."25
The most notable aspect of the new federal system of government was the willingness of Bismarck to cooperate with the Liberals, many of whom he had previously opposed and defied. It appears as if the Chancellor wanted to ensure the success of the new system, and in order to reduce opposition, wished to cooperate with his old antagonists. 26 He had originally gained liberal acquiescence by appealing to their desire for German unity; with that accomplished, he made small concessions to their social and economic demands (much to the chagrin of the Junkers) by promoting free trade and other liberal economic policies. 27 In return for the economic concessions, the liberals were willing to support Bismarck and the new Empire because of the economic benefits which they derived. However, in gaining economic concessions, they forfeited all claims that they had made to exert control over the ministers, direction of foreign and domestic policy, control of the army, and, most importantly, they forfeited their rights to civil liberties. 28
Once unification had been achieved, Bismarck's interest was no longer to provoke wart but, instead, to enable Germany to "keep what she had acquired, and the best way to insure this was to preserve peace." 29 During the years following the Franco-Prussian War and until his fall from power (1871-1890), Bismarck used his formidable diplomatic skills to promote German security and peace among the giant industrial states of Europe. Commenting upon the first decade of Bismarck's rule, historian William H. Dawson says:
He had gained his end in face of enormous difficulties, and had gained
it by devious ways and drastic means, but therein he had fulfilled the
prophesy with which he had entered Ministerial life. Unity had come not
by liberty, as the idealists had wished, but by force; the German question
had been settled not by Diet majorities and parliamentary speeches, but
literally by blood and iron. 30
CHAPTER THREE
DISRAELI'S RISE TO POWER: HIS LITERATURE,
POLITICAL THEORIES, AND PARLIAMENTARY CAREER
As a young Jewish man, Benjamin Disraeli was extremely aware of his social and political environment, and was a "keen observer of the motivations which shaped men and their institutions." 31 His early years found him embedded in his literary pursuits, writing novels which are, today, famous for their autobiographical content, and which shed some light on the early development of Disraeli's political thinking.
His first novel was Vivian Grev, which he wrote at age twenty-one; this first publication set the tone for all of Disraeli's future works, the expounding of his views on such subjects as English society, politics, history, and religion. This first work, and all subsequent ones, are not exactly models of literary perfection and masterpiece, but they did stir quite a bit of attention because of their relevant social comments. Disraeli was quickly branded a "political novelist" who was a "practicing extension of the politician." 32 As the author himself wrote in the Preface to Vivian Grey:
It was not originally the intention of the writer to adopt the form of fiction as the instrument to scatter his suggestions, but after reflection he resolved to avail himself of a method which offered the best chance of influencing opinion. 33
From the very outset of his career, argument, debates, a desire to win adherence and support, and the respect for public opinion were all factors which played an important role in motivating Benjamin Disraeli. Some of the young author's later writings, particularly those which are now referred to as the Young England trilogy (Conningsby, Sybil, and Tancred), all portray a young hero who is employed "to present a clear view of Disraeli's conception of meaningful, traditional political principle."34 Conningsby and Sybil demonstrate the author's interest in political history, and Tancred is primarily a religious dissertation: in this latter wbrk Disraeli expounds on the limitations and prejudices which are incurred in a young Jewish man's rise to prominence. In this series , Disraeli himself acknowledges that he was expressing *the ideal side of politics."35 Historian Richard Levine writes of the future British Prime Minister's literature:
The attention the author gives to history and politics... tend(s) to bind most of the novels together. 36
In each novel the protagonist is brought to see the efficacy of the great principles of the past. He begins in utter frustration after learning that no great principles guide present English life; he concludes in a state of great hope after being led to understand the great principle.37
Disraeli's novels concerned themselves with the great contemporary issues of his time; issues such as Parliamentary Reform, the Chartist Movement, Utilitarianism, the impact of science upon society, and the effects of the Industrial Revolution were the burning topics which English readers devoured. The question-that was uppermost in the minds of most thinking Englishmen was the "condition of England"; one historian has stated that nineteenth century England was "an age of anxiety, an age of flux- traditional institutions were challenged from every corner... Never before .. . had an age been forced so thoroughly to re-evaluate the very roots of its existence."38
Upon this scene burst the young Benjamin Disraeli with his political
novelist attempting in his own way to make an imprint upon the thinking
of Englishmen. At the ripe age of twenty-eight, Disraeli indicated his
unabashed ambition when he wrote in his diary:
The world calls me conceited. The world is in error. I trace all the
blunders of my life to sacrificing my opinion to that of others... I have
an unerring instinct- I can read characters at a glance; few men can deceive
me. My mind is a continental mind . . . a revolutionary mind. I am only
truly great in action. If ever I am placed in a truly eminent position,
I shall prove this. I could rule the House of Commons, although there would
be a great prejudice against me at first.39
During the early years of his manhood, his writings were the avenue through which Disraeli expressed his ideas, gained notoriety, earned friends, and obtained a little money to support himself. He wrote quite a bit of himself, indicating his desire to enter into politics and become actively involved in those pursuits. Of his literary works, he wrote: "I wish to act what I write. My works are the embodification of my feelings. In Vivian Grey I have portrayed my active and real imagination." 40 The role that his literary works played in presenting his political philosophy to the English public cannot be underestimated. Conningsby and Sybil are described by historian Willaim F. Monypenny as "political documents...Woven into their texture there is a theory of English history and of modern English politics which is nowhere else in Disraeli's works so explicitly developed . . . In all essentials it represents Disraeli's conception of what may be called the Tory Idea, and of the background of history in which he formed that idea; it lies at the root of all his convictions and conduct as a statesman." 41
Disraeli's theories, with regard to English history and politics, were designed to counter those which the Whig historians had advanced through the years.
Some historians, such as Monypenny, maintain that it was Disraeli's objective to eatablish theories which adequately portrayed developments in English history; these theories were primarily concerned with countering Whig interpretations of the Glorious Revolution and the Civil War. 42
Disraeli's own words seem to prove this assumption when he stated:
The derivation and character of political parties; the condition of the people which had been the main consequence of them; the duties of the Church as a main remedial agency in our present state, were the three principal topics which I intended to treat, but I found that they were too vast for the space I had allotted to myself. They were all launched in Conningsby, but the origin and condition of political parties . . .was the only one completely handled in that work.43
The political philosophy that he sought to expound is best explained in his own words:
The Throne at the centre, and the people at the circumference; and on the maintenance of their normal and unimpeded interaction the health and balance of all depends."44
He further explained that "the privileges of the multitude and the prerogatives of the Sovereign had grown up together..." From the very outset of his career, Disraeli believed that both the Crown and Parliament should strive to maintain a harmonious working relationship with each other; unlike many of his contemporaries, he refused the temptation to assume absolute power. He always insisted that the British Sovereign had its proper place and function to perform in the machinery of government; his Ministry saw his repeated attempts to encourage Queen Victoria to play a more active role in politics.
While all of his novels helped to advance his political philosophy, Disraeli ran for a seat in Parliament several times before he finally won election in 1838. For the first several years of his parliamentary life, Disraeli showed himself to be a competent Member and an excellent debater. Many members of the Tory, or Conservative, Party recognized him as a young. man of promise and ability; however, when the Tories, led by Sir Robert Peel, formed a government in 1841, Disraeli was not invited to become a Minister in the Peel Cabinet. As one historian remarks:
Exclusion from the government had the appearance of setting the seal . . . on his reputation as a dandy, recalling his early political escapades as a youth, and thrusting his non-Anglo-Saxon origins into the limelight of public review.45
Indeed, it appears as if there was a "great prejudice against me at first", but it did not remain confined to his early years of public life; there was to be a "great prejudice" against him throughout his entire career. Although he was clever and original, and his speeches had a "quality of thoughtfulness, breadth of view, and literary finish ..." 47 which many admired, Disraeli was not able to inspire confidence among his party colleagues, and had not yet attained the respect of the House of Commons.
From 1841 to 1846, Disraeli maintained his position in the House of Commons, continually proving his loyalty to his party, and demonstrating to his colleagues theimmense parliamentary knowledge and talents which he possessed; among the latter was his extraordinary debating ability, which is probably the most important factor that accounts for his rise to the leadership of the Tory Party, and, eventually, to the position of Prime Minister. 48
In 1846, Disraeli launched an attack upon his own party's leader and the current Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel; it was at this time that Disraeli differed with Peel on a matter of principle, and had made the decision to fight his party boss publicly. In a series of debates in the House of Commons, he reproached the Prime Minister by using two of his most powerful weapons- ridicule and sarcasm- in an attempt to discredit the Peel government's new economic policies. Disraeli and a large number of the Tories refused follow Peel as the Government abandoned their previous policy of Protection in favor of Free Trade; Disraeli portrayed the party as having been "betrayed and deserted"50 by the Peel Ministry. To such a degree did Disraeli believe his party leader was abandoning the Un party, and forfeiting his principles, that, in the confrontation with Peel, he made the classic statements "Let men stand by the principles by which they rise, right or wrong."51 It was largely due to these personal attacks by Disraeli that the Peel Ministry capitulated, and Peel and his followers broke with the Tory Party.52
This was the manner in which Benjamin Disraeli became leader of the Tory Party in 1847; he was not appointed to that position by his Sovereign, nor did it come to him as a result of long years of faithful toil and devotion to the party. Instead, he inherited the party leadership by default, as every conservative gentleman of ministerial calibre (with the exception of Stanley (later to be Lord Derby) was a follower of Sir Robert Peel; all of the able administrators were Peelites, and their secession from the Conservative Party left the latter totally barren of quality leadership.53 Had it not been for this, as historian Robert Blake says of the events "He would not otherwise have become leader in the House of Commons when he did."54
The immediate task which confronted Disraeli and the Tory Party was the job of rebuilding the party; it must be noted that this task was not an easy one, as he could not proceed as he alone desired. The very nature of political parties and parliamentary government compelled him to take into account the opinions of the highly respected Lord Derby and those of the party's membership.55
Thus, in the first decade of Disraeli's public service, he had risen from the obscure position of a backbencher to that of leader of the Conservative Party, sitting at the forefront of the Opposition bench. Possessing a keen mind, quick wit, and enormous confidence in himself, Disraeli's political future still did not seem secure; confronted with the secession of one-third of his party's Parliamentary membership the task of reconciliation and maintenance of party discipline was not made any easier by the fact that many Tories distrusted the former Jew, and were more than suspicious of his every move. Though he had obtained the party leadership within a decade of his first having entered Parliament, the prospects for a strong, unified party did not appear bright. As historian William F. Monypenny comments:
He had forced his way, over great obstacles and not without arousing
strong animosities, to the front of the Parliamentary stage, had become
the Chief of Staff to a party leaders had gathered around him a band of
staunch political friends, and was in a fair way to overcome the ingrained
prejudices of the country gentleman..., (But) a false move might imperil
all he had won.56
CHAPTER FOUR
BISMARCK'S CONDUCT AS A STATESMAN
As previously mentioned, Bismarck came to power during a period in which extreme difficulties existed between the King and the Prussian National Assembly. For various reasons, among them a desire to enhance his own position. Bismarck pursued a foreign policy which would consolidate Prussian leadership among the German states, and make Prussia's leadership in northern Germany unassailable.57
The main task was to develop Prussia's strength through the establishment of a strong, independent army, the expansion of the Prussian economy, and through the intricacies of an alliance system. As he said in these early years, "Foreign affairs ate the most important thing for me. In my opinion. they stand before any other task."58 This certainly suggests that domestic considerations were merely secondary thoughts to Bismarck, at least at this point in his career.
Prior to his having become the King's Minister, Bismarck had already formulated ideas regarding Prussia's future relations with Russia, France, and Austria, he is said to have believed that Prussia's foreign policy in 1862 ought to be based around the indispensable need for a continuance of good relations with Russia, and the neutralization of France. Granted this, Prussia might then be unencumbered in her attempts to remedy the impossible situation that had long existed vis 'a vis Austria and their respective positions in the Germanic Confederation.59
The motives that he had and the methods which he chose to accomplish such goals were not always admirable; as some of Bismarck's biographers note: "Bismarck set out to exploit the idea of nationalism and the yearning for national unity in the interest of Prussia. Hopefully, it would provide the moral basis for war and the means with which to arouse popular enthusiasm for the conflict." 60 Never did he appear to hesitate in using war as an instrument through which he could marshal nationalistic sentiments in support of him and his government. He carefully manipulated forces and "gave priority to might over right in both domestic and foreign" affairs. 61
The Chancellor's technique was, as one historian has described it, an "extraordinary mixture of rough frankness and subtle caution."62 Another historian, Gordon Craig, states that "he was more clearly the opportunist than the man of clearly defined principle"; his policies were "motivated by a desire to save his own position and to discredit his enemies.63 He was an "opportunist" in the sense that his unscrupulous nature aided him in taking advantage of whatever came along. The fact that he was also an excellent judge of men, and their motivations, helped him with respect to his opportunism; he calculated perfectly when he assumed that Napolean III would seek war against Prussia only when internal pressure from the French people forced him to take such action. Therefore, being armed with this knowledge, Bismarck held the trump card in that he knew how to provoke a war with France (i.e., insult the French people via the Ems dispatch- 1870) when he felt the time to be opportune. 64
Bismarck's mastery of politics and the art of diplomacy are manifestly evidenced in his actions; these actions were always dependent upon the circumstances of the situation in which Bismarck found himself. As one historian has said of him:
Bismarck alone kept the initiative by knowing beforehand how the others would react to his moves. He made them his tools, and they did what he wanted them to do. His superiority towers above them...85
In his method of approaching diplomacy, Bismarck's theory was to always keep his options open; when he was attacked by German conservatives for his part in increasing Prussian ties with France, he, significantly, kept this principle in mind when he replied: "To me, France is the most dubious of allies, although I must hold open the possibility of such an alliance because one cannot play chess if sixteen out of the sixty-four squares are excluded from the game." 66 He added to this that "one must always have two irons in the fire." 67 Thus, Bismarck always had two or more policies which enabled him to adapt his moves to any situation.
In adopting such a method, he often settled on a course which was not popular, but the end result of his policies always acquitted him in the eyes of the German people. When reflecting in later years on the type of methods which he employed, Bismarck said of himself: "More than anything else, politics demands the capacity to recognize intuitively in each new situation where the correct path lies. The statesman must see things ahead of time and be prepared for them..."68
This is probably the key to reaching an understanding of all of Bismarck's successes, both foreign and domestic; he had the ability to be prepared for future events because he had the ability to control his political and diplomatic environment, manipulating forces that would bring about what he desired. He alone is responsible for wreaking havoc among his domestic opponents, dividing them, and then taking advantage of their disunity; he manipulated foreign affairs and connived in such a way as to play England and France off against each other; and he allied Prussia with both Austria and Russia in the late 1860's in a successful bid to isolate France in the European community. 69
The Chancellor carried these divisive policies one step further as he introduced them same tactics on the Prussian domestic scene; he actually promoted his own domestic turmoils in order to gain the King's confidence. This is evidenced in the fact that, at one time, he encouraged some members of the parliamentary body to espouse the cause of Polish rebels living in East Prussia, he was then able to point-out to King William that the forces of revolution were still alive, and that it was he who could successfully defy the parliamentary body's attempts to infringe upon the rights of the Sovereign to control the government's policies. Thus, through many means, Otto von Bismarck made King William dependent upon him. In a later attempt to justify these actions, he pleaded that "I could gain his (William) complete trust only by showing him that I was not afraid of the chamber." 70
When Bismarck had first become a servant of the King, he had felt that it was necessary for him to circumvent the liberal majority in the Prussian National Assembly, He accomplished this goal by refusing to cooperate with the liberals, and by defying the power of the Assembly. He firmly believed that the parliamentarians were attempting to thwart the government's ability to carry on its business, and were also attempting to usurp some of the King's prerogatives (i.e., control of the army, and direction of foreign affairs). With respect to these domestic complications, Bismarck continued to follow his patented strategy of "divide and conquer"; his divisive techniques threw both liberals and conservatives so off balance that he could pursue those policies which he deemed essential (i.e., foreign affairs).71
When he delivered his famous "blood and iron" speech, many historians see it as slap in the face delivered to the liberals; in the speech, Bismarck may have meant to demonstrate to the liberal parliamentary majority that they would have no influence in determining the policies which the Prussian government would pursue. The speech was designed to point out that the elements which would make Prussia's future secure were the wise exercise of diplomacyt a strong and independent army, and the development of the Prussian economy.72
The process of unification, and Bismarck's preoccupation with foreign affairs, were the highlights of his first decade in power; once the unification of Germany had been completed, the German Chancellor moved towards a consolidation of his political power by employing intimidation (i.e., his threats of a military coup), appeals to the nationalistic sentiments of the German people, and by invoking the gratitude of the people toward him through his constant threats of resignation.73
During this first decade of public life, the Iron Chancellor went his own wayl the policies that he pursued were often carried out against the wishes of others. such as the Crown Prince, the King himself, and, most importantly, the military.
One historian notes of these early years, "Bismarck lived in constant and increasing tension with the military group. No statesman gave the Prussian army greater opportunity for triumph, yet, he was not popular with military men."74 Much of this opposition came from those persons who worked intimately with the Chancellor, such as Albrecht von Roon, his Minister of War. Roon, along with other military men, did not like the creation of the German Empire, and were even more vocal of their protest of such domestic policies as universal manhood suffrage. It appears as if the military feared that their independent position, heretofore free from any civilian or parliamentary control, was in jeopardy.75
The greatest difficulties arose between Bismarck and the military leaders as to the conduct of war. Following the war with Austria in 1867, Bismarck remarked:
In positions such as ours was then, it is a political maxim after victory not to enquire how much you can squeeze out of your opponents, but only to consider what is politically necessary . . . The ill-feeling which my attitude earned for me in military circles I considered was the result of a military departmental policy to which I could not concede a decisive influence on the policy of the state and its future.76
Such a stance is further explained by Bismarck when he noted the following:
I was the only person present at headquarters who was politically responsible as a minister and forced by the exigencies of the situation to form an opinion and come to a decision without being able to lay the responsibility for the result upon any other authority. . . I was just as little able as anyone to foresee what shape future events would take, and the consequent judgment of the world; but I was the only one present who was under a legal obligation to hold, to utter, and to defend an opinion.77
Following unification, Bismarck concentrated more upon domestic affairs. As he said in 1877, "For the first fifteen years of my ministerial life I was absorbed in foreign affairs and did not regard it as my business to trouble myself seriously about the domestic policy of the Empire..."78
We have seen that Bismarck's first attempts to formulate a domestic policy resulted in a program which was designed to discredit his liberal opponents and defy the power of the parliament. As the Chancellor began to devote himself more to domestic issues, he attempted to silence all persons who opposed the government. He instituted campaigns of reprisal, torture, and police harassment in an attempt to root out his domestic opposition.79
Ostensibly because he desired national unity, cohesion, and wished to prevent foreign agitation in Germany's domestic affairs. Bismarck directed a large scale"campaign of repression" against the Catholics in Germany. 80 The famed May Laws were introduced to limit clerical training, candidates for the priesthood, and all church appointments. There was also a bill designed to remove all schools and educational facilities from the control of the Catholic Church. To secure this policy and ensure its successful implementation, methods such as harassment by government prosecutors. imprisonment for no just cause and without trial, and the sequestering of Church property, were all condoned by the government. 81
Bismarck's fears of domestic unrest were highly justified; the wars of unification had brought Prussia new territories such as Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine. The German Empire had become composed of Frenchmen, Danes, and Poles, as well as disgruntled liberals from the German principalities. Thus, race, language, and religious barriers rapidly became problems with which Bismarck found himself occupied; in order that internal dissension would not weaken the newly formed Empire, the Chancellor reacted with his programs of repression. 82 Bismarck's extreme fear of disunion or revolution was his AM justification for the persecution of the Catholics and the socialists; as he said:
In face of the dangers resulting from our wars, I regarded the differences between (political) parties as subordinate in comparison with the necessity of political protection from external attack by serrying our ranks as far as possible as a united nation.83
Bismarck was distrustful of the policies which the socialists were propounding in the 1870's; he feared the effects which they would have in Germany. Thus, the campaign which he used to silence the Catholic opposition was minor when compared to the one which he launched against the socialists. As he said in 1876: "I regard the Social Democratic elements as an enemy against which the State and society must arm themselves."84
Two years later, in 1878, the first of the antisocialist laws went into effect. Socialist meetings, speeches, demonstrations, and publications were all prohibited. Those persons convicted of being socialist agitators were liable to heavy fines and imprisonment. However, by 1881, Bismarck had recognized his errors repression of the socialists was not the way through which he could assure himself of the support of the working classes and count on their patriotic adherence to the Empire. Therefore, he made attempts to reform local government and the tax system; government insurance was provided to workers in order to protect against accident, sickness, and old age disability. These programs were motivated by the Chancellor's desire to demonstrate to the workers that the Government was their friend; he also had the ulterior motive of under-cutting the growing power of the socialists.85 In any case, Bismarck's policies of repression were combined with an attempt to gain the support of the workers; as historian William H. Dawson notes:
Repression at this time went hand in hand with attempts to conciliate the working classes by ameliorative legislation; the effect was to cause the Government's professions of good-will to be received with sullen ingratitude.86
Another attempt which was made to incur the favor of the masses and isolate the socialists was the promotion of universal manhood suffrage. As historian Otto Pflanze describes it:
It was a way to end the internal conflict in Prussia by reconciling liberal nationalists to authoritarian rule and by providing an electoral system which might produce majorities favorable to the government.87
With such programs, one can readily see how distasteful the Bismarck government was to the old. hard-line conservatives in Germany. They were appalled at the Chancellor's suggestions of universal suffrage, and they actively opposed his government because of the ties which he had developed with such liberal elements as the National Liberals.
However, the political wind had begun to change for Bismarck; having silenced the liberal opposition by dividing them)allying with some, and persecuting others,, the conservatives had risen to the forefront of opposition. They were prompted primarily out of economic necessity, not political differences. The depression which had hit Prussia in the early 1870's had caused the iron and steel industries, as well as the agrarians, to organize themselves into strong lobbying interests. Their purpose was to urge the Government not to repeal the import duties on iron; Protection became the policy which they proclaimed was necessary for the resumption of growth and continued expansion in the Prussian economy. 88 Bismarck saw in all of this an opportunity for him to introduce further reforms of the tax system, revising it in such a manner as to increase imperial revenues and thus make the government independent of the Reichstag and the states. Consequently, the economic issue of Protection versus Free Trade became the vehicle through which Bismarck shucked his old alliance with the National Liberals, turned to the Conservatives and the Catholics, and moved to make the Imperial Government financially independent of the parliamentary body.
If there should be any suspicion that Bismarck was contemptuous of legislative bodies, we must realize that, all during his career, the Chancellor opposed any introduction of democracy into Germany. He justified this in his statement that "the judgment of the masses is sufficiently stultified and underdeveloped to allow them, with the assistance of their own greed, to be continually caught by the rhetoric of clever and ambitious leaders." 89 He also opposed the establishment of political parties in the Reichstag; he felt that the keen competition, which would inevitably come with political parties, would also bring with it a lowering of the standards of honor and decency. As we have seen, Bismarck was not a man whose methods and practices are notable for their standards of honor, neither was the Chancellor a man of high integrity and principle. However, he did have his own moral code, despite the fact that it was established on a double standard. Somehow, Bismarck made a distinction between public and private conduct; statesmen and diplomats could act unscrupulous in their private dealings, but he felt that such displays by political parties, in public, were immoral.90
The following statement, which was made in the latter years of his life,-exhibits the degree to which he was morally conscious of his actions:
It was impossible during the development of our politics always to foresee with certainty whether the road which I took was the right one, and yet I was obliged to act as though I could predict with absolute clearness both coming events and the effects which my own decisions would have upon them. The question whether his own estimate, his political instinct , is leading him rightly, is difficult . . . For a minister who completely identifies his own honor with that of his country, the uncertainty of each political decision has a most harassing effect.91
Though he succeeded in allying with his strongest critics, Bismarck did have serious opposition to his government during the last decade (1880-1890) of his service. As in the early years of his rule, he sometimes found some of his opponents within his administration; upon one such occasion, he had written to a dissident, who happened to be the German ambassador in France:
The friction of our state machine must not be still further increased. I can put up with any contradiction to myself personally, as long as it proceeds from so competent a source as yourself, but I cannot officially share with anyone the task of advising the King in this (specific) matter; and if his Majesty were to call on me to do any such thing, I should have to resign my post.92
Opposition to the Chancellor became more frequent, more public, and
more vocal than the squeamish dissents which his colleagues had voiced
in earlier years; former colleagues became more ambitious for better positions
for themselves, and intrigues against the Chancellor became commonplace.
The Crown's support for him was often weak, and was sometimes found lacking.
When the great Iron Chancellor finally resigned in 1890, he placed the
blame for his "ouster" upon the Court intrigues that had been carried on
by his ambitious opponents, and even upon the lack of support which he
had received from the new young king, William II. Reflecting upon his last
years in office, when he was confronted with such opposition and intrigue,
Bismarck said: "I had the impression of being face to face with a system
of gradual pressure which aimed at ousting me from the political leadership."93
CHAPTER FIVE
DISRAELI AS A STATESMAN
Benjamin Disraeli had not been born into a family of high station, either in prominence or wealth; his father and his ancestors were of Jewish origins, and, for these reasons, the young Disraeli did not embark upon political life with many prospects for success. Because of his birth and his religion, "he needed forty years to reach the level from which a Peel, a Gladstone, a Manners, had started off." 94 Many men, ambitious for a political career, would have fallen by the wayside if they had been faced with such similar obstacles. Though Disraeli persevered and eventually won a seat for himself in Parliament, he had many opponents who harbored a deep hatred towards him.95 With respect to this, historian William F. Monypenny noted:
Apart from any laxity of principle or anything in his political conduct that might account for his reputation, Disraeli is seen to have been one of those men who have the unfortunate knack of inspiring even more distrust than they deserve.96
Though he lacked the ability to inspire the confidence of other men in himself, Disraeli acquired the leadership of the Tory Party in the House of Commons following the fall of Sir Robert Peel. As has previously been noted, however, the mantle of the party leadership fell to him primarily because of default, as most of the party's leaders followed Peel into separation from the Conservative Party. Thus, he obtained the party leadership before he had earned the party's confidence.97
In addition to lacking the confidence of his own party, Queen Victoria strongly despised him saying of him in 1851: "I do not approve of Mr. Disraeli. I do not approve of his conduct to Sir Robert Peel."98
Faced with opposition from his Sovereign and from elements within his
own party, Disraeli's career was confronted with seemingly insurmountable
obstacles that would prevent his ever attaining a higher position in government.
However, the Tory leader set about to demonstrate his capacity to lead
his party as he espoused strong political principles. He made eloquent
statements to the British people concerning the aims and the desires of
the Tory Party; in one speech he stated that "we wish to support and maintain
the institutions of the country, but we also wish to improve them. We believe
that the best way to maintain the institutions of the country is
to improve them when improvement is necessary..."99 He added in
a later speech that the principles of the Tory Party were perfectly compatible
with the necessity for reform, when reform was required. As he stated:
The Tory party is only in its proper position when it represents popular principles. Then it can uphold the throne and the altar, the majesty of the empire, the liberty of the nation, and the rights of the multitude. There is nothing mean, petty, or exclusive, about the real character of Toryism.100
Thus, Disraeli had decided to devote himself and his party's programs to the bettering of the conditions in which the working classes lived and worked. He felt that England's stable political institutions had enabled them to contribute to the betterment of English living, and to the increased prosperity which the English economy enjoyed.101 Hence, he reasoned that social reform was a field in which the Tories should concentrate; in a rather lengthy justification for this policy, he maintained that a coalition between working class and landowners could provide the future foundation of support for the Tory Party. The following is part of that justification:
In a progressive country, change is constant; and the great question is not whether you should resist change which is inevitable, but whether that change should be carried out in deference to abstract principles, and arbitrary and general doctrines. The one is a national system; the other is a philosophic system. Both have great advantages: the national party is supported by the the fervour of patriotism; the philosophic party has a singular exemption from the force of prejudice.
I have always considered that the Tory Party was the national party of England. It is not formed of a combination of oligarchs and philsophers who practise on the sectarian prejudices of a portion of the people. It is formed of all classes from the highest to the most homely, and it upholds a series of institutions that are in theory, and ought to be in practice, an embodiment of the national requirements and the security of the national rights. Whenever the Tory party degenerates into an oligarchy it becomes unpopular; whenever the national institutions do not fulfill their original intention, the Tory party becomes odious; but when the people are led by the natural leaders, and when, by their united influence, the national institutions fulfill their original intention, the Tory party is triumphant...102
Between the time he had become party leader in 1847 and the passage of the Parliamentary Reform Bill of 1867, Disraeli actively sought to convert the opinion of his party colleagues to support a change in the nation's suffrage. Believing that such a policy would be beneficial to both the nation and the Tory Party, he stated:
None are so interested in maintaining the institutions of the country as the working classes. The rich and the powerful will not find much difficulty under any circumstances in maintaining their rights, but the privileges of the people can only be defended and secured by popular institutions.103
The issue of extending the voter franchise became a political volleyball when the Liberal Party began to support it in an attempt to reap political advantage for their espousal of the cause. In disgust, Disraeli remarked:
If there is anything more likely than another to poison the feelings of the people and to alienate their best sentiments from the institutions of the country, it is the suspicion permitted to be engendered in the public mind that schemes for reconstructing those institutions are used by public men for party purposes. It is impossible that a question like that of Parliamentary Reform can be hung up and taken down at the convenience of any statesman, so that when in Opposition he is to brandish it in the face of those in office, and when a Minister to place it in a rusty scabbard. Under these circumstances, we feel it our duty to consider that question, and we shall consider it with the earnest determination of endeavoring to make a settlement of it that will be satisfactory to the sober-minded people of this country.104
In spite of Disraeli's efforts, Parliamentary Reform remained "a game to be played on the Parliamentary stage, useful for the purpose of gaining or retaining office, but not seriously meant either by Whigs or by Tories as a party, however earnest some individual politicians might be in its pursuit."105
When the issue was finally taken up in 1867, it had still not lost its political value in terms of which party was going to receive the credit for its passage, and thereby incur the favor of the newly enfranchised voters. As Disraeli wrote of the Liberal's parliamentary maneuvers:
The game of the Whigs is this: to preach very Conservative views in the Press, so that we may be deterred from bringing forward a bold measure, and they, consequently, be enabled to resume their old position of the reforming party, which we have turned. If we pursue the bold course, which they suspect we are following, then they count on defalcations from our own ranks, which will strengthen them in a Conservative opposition.106
Despite what he believed to be "the manoevres of Parliamentary intrigue and all the machinations of party warfare"107, Disraeli maintained a consistent course toward extension of the voter franchise, and effectively retained control of the Tory Party to that passage of the Reform Bill was secured in 1867. The effect of the Bill was to double the number of voters; however, the new voters were not particularly grateful to Disraeli for giving them their franchise, and responded, in their first votes cast, to the appeals of the Liberal Party.
For the quarter of a century in which he served as leader of the Tory Party, Disraeli spent twenty years of it as leader of the Opposition. The most fruitful years of his life were spent out of official capacity. They were "years of watching and waiting and criticising."108 His function as party leader was that of a compromiser between party members; he made concessions to some, and effected modification of opinion among others. 109 But, as he described his primary functions "The business of an Opposition is to oppose; consequently, it is impossible for an Opposition leader to escape the reproach of being factious...110 However, he was the most eloquent, if partisan, spokesman who espoused the principles of the Tory Party. He enthralled his parliamentary colleagues with his biting humor, his quick sarcasms, and the vast diversity of knowledge which he exhibited on the floor of the House of Commons. His speeches often stirred applause, and, sometimes, genuine approval, from his most ardent opponents. His eloquence could change men's minds and, more importantly, their votes:
His attacks upon Gladstone's Liberal government(1868-1874) were some of the most interesting speeches he ever made. In one he notes:
If you look back to the history of this country since the advent of Liberalism- forty years ago- you will find that there has been no effort so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much energy, and carried on with so much ability and acumen, as the attempts of Liberalism to effect the disintegration of the Empire of England.111
By 1873, Disraeli was using all of his oratorical abilities in an effort to discredit the Gladstone Ministry, and drive it from office. He wrote a revealing letter of this situation to his secretary, which follows:
The Government continues in a discredited state, but we have not availed ourselves, as much as we ought to have done, of several recent opportunities. It seems that the Ministry will totter through the session, though at the present, the decomposition of the great Liberal party is complete. It still keeps, on the surface, together, from the hope, I think a vain one, that 'something will turn up' for them: the last resources of imbecility and exhaustion.112
If Disraeli's debating abilities provided the party with a leader behind whom they could rally, so did the principles upon which the man stood. His humility toward his position; his genuine concern for the future of his party; the anxiety which he felt over the future welfare of his country, all of these factors prompted him, at various times, to offer his resignation to his party colleagues if they felt that the party could be led more capably by someone other than himself. As early as 1859, he had stated: "I am prepared to take any step or make any sacrifice . . . (for) the welfare of the country."113
Again, in 1860, when the great issue of Parliamentary Reform was moving towards its final resolution, Disraeli made the following statement:
For the first time the question of Parliamentary Reform has ceased to be a party question, and the Tories are cleared of the taint of opposition to popular franchise, they command half the House, and stand high in the country.
So long as they were in distress, I have borne without a murmur the neglect, the desertion, the personal insults, that I have experienced... but the Tories are no longer in distress... I must therefore take a step, which I wished to have done at the meeting of Parliament. I must resign a leadership which I unwillingly accepted, and to which it is my opinion that fourteen years of unqualified devotion have not reconciled the party.114
The obstacles which Disraeli had faced in becoming a Member of Parliament, and then in acquiring the leadership of the Tory Party, had been enormous, and yet, faced with continued opposition within his own party, he was willing to resign all that he had fought to obtain, if he believed it would be in the best interests of the party and the country. To some degree, one must admit that this sacrifice of personal position, and whatever ambitions he had for the future, indicates the intensity with which he held his personal convictions; historian William F. Monypenny, also noting this, commented that there was "an amazing continuity of thought in the principles that underlie his whole career."115 George Buckle added to this description his belief that Disraeli's humility and genuine concern for the welfare of the nation is evidenced in the fact that "improvement of the condition of the people had been Disraeli's aim throughout, in or out of office..."116
Disraeli's first acquisition of the Prime Ministership had come to him as a result of the resignation of Lord Derby, the Tory leader in the House of Lords, in 1868. His first tenure as Prime Minister was short-lived, due to the fact that Tories were attempting to govern while the Liberal Party had a majority in the House of Commons. The Disraeli Ministry was allowed to complete the work which the Tories had begun in the area of electoral reform; with the passage of the supplementary legislation necessary to complement the 1867 Reform Bill, the Disraeli Government was defeated by a vote of no-confidence in the Commons; and,in the ensuing general election, the Liberal Party swept to victory.
As was previously mentioned, the years 1868-1874 were spent in Opposition for the Tory Party. During this time, British prestige abroad sunk dramatically as a result of the weak foreign policy of the Gladstone Administration; and, Gladstone's "acquiescence in Russian demands..."117 increasingly angered the British electorate and the Tory Party.
Meanwhile, the Tory leader had rejuvenated his literary prowess and published several new novels, and among them was Lothair . The novels satirized society and government, and Disraeli described them as "political novels dealing with the events of the day..."118 However, most historians will agree that the novels focused attention on Disraeli, not all of it favorable, and "revived all the former doubts as to whether a Jewish literary man, so dowered with imagination, and so unconventional in his outlook, was the proper person to lead a Conservative party to victory."119
By 1872, the Conservatives, deprived of office and increasingly uneasy over the course which the Gladstone Administration was pursuing, became restless with Disraeli's leadership. Many younger members of the party, sensing public dissatisfaction with Gladstone, began to feel that they could carry the party to victory: without the old, complacent Jewish leader, whom many persons still distrusted, victory at the polls could be brought soon. What many of the impetuous young members did not realize was that Disraeli was actually pursuing a policy that would bring the defeat of the Gladstone Ministry; his policy was one of giving Gladstone a loose enough rope in which the Liberal Prime Minister would eventually hang himself.
As George Buckle says of this period:
The years of reserve in opposition, when he appeared to his colleagues and followers to be apathetic, he had been quietly working at Conservative reorganization, and creating a machine which was to lead to the victory of '74 and to be the forerunner of the great party organizations..120
Again, Benjamin Disraeli was able to maintain control of the Tory Party; his tactics paid off in 1874 as the party swept to power. relying primarily on the British electorate's "wounded pride at the disrepute of their country abroad." 121 With the massive electoral victory, Disraeli again became Prime Minister.
Following the victory, Disraeli set about to construct his Cabinet; choosing men of talent, and men with whom he had both confidence and a good working relationship, meant the difference between a strong Government and an ineffectual one. Realizing that talent , alone, in a Cabinet does not always breed harmony and efficiency, he desired to select those men with whom he could work. In the end, his cautiousness in selecting a Cabinet proved Disraeli to be a wise politician, and the 1874 "Cabinet was bound together by strong confidence in its chief." 122
Of this post-election period, historian George Buckle leaves us with the following summation:
Disraeli regarded his life as a brightly tinted romance, with himself as hero. By genius and resolution, in spite of a thousand obstacles, the 'Jew boy', the despised adventurer, had reached the summit of place and power. His countrymen had unmistakably expressed their desire to be governed by him; he was supported by a large majority in both Houses of Parliament, all signs of dissatisfaction in the party to his leadership having disappeared. He was surrounded by a capable and unusually homogeneous band of colleagues. He was regarded with peculiar favor by his Sovereign.123.
At this point in his career, Disraeli still had a strong sense of the pattern of British history, and a deep respect for the rights of man. Through his political philosophy and the programs which he championed, we have seen the genuine concern which he had for England and her people. Interestingly, following the 1874 electoral victory, Disraeli made the following speech:
I have been alarmed recently by learning, from what I suppose is the highest Liberal authority, that a Conservative Government cannot endure, because it has been returned by Conservative working men, and a Conservative working man is an anomaly. We have been told that a working man cannot be Conservative, because he has nothing to conserve- he has neither land nor capital . . .
There are things in my opinion even more precious than land and capital, and without which land and capital themselves would be of little worth. What, for instance, is land without, liberty? And what is capital without justice? The working classes of this country have inherited personal rights which the nobility of other nations do not yet possess. Their persons and their homes are sacred. They have no fear of arbitrary arrest or domiciliary visits. They know that the administration of law in this country is pure, and that it is no respecter of individuals or classes. They know very well that their industry is unfettered, and that by the law of this country, they may combine to protect the interests of labour... Surely these are privileges worthy of being preserved: Can we therefore be surprised that a nation that possesses such rights should wish to preserve them? And if that be the case, is it wonderful that working classes are Conservative.124
He described his social policy to a friend as "a policy round which the country can rally."125 With his encouragement, the programs that were pursued by his Ministry constitute what historian Robert Blake has termed "the biggest installment of social reform passed by any one government in the nineteenth century."126 It included two Trade Union Acts, a Public Health Act, an Agricultural Holding Act, the River Pollution Act, the Merchant Shipping and Education Act, an Artisan Dwellings Act, which sought to replace slums with adequate housing; a Factory Act, which protected female and child labor from exploitation; and, the Sale of Food and Drug Act, which established long-needed sanitary laws. All together, the policy was an attempt on the part of the government to fulfill their promises of bettering the living and working conditions of the British working classes.
Disraeli's Ministry had been elected with a mandate from the British electorate to remedy the disastrous effects of Gladstone's foreign policy. Therefore, when he assumed the direction of British foreign policy, Disraeli's objectives were:
1. To re-establish British prestige among the nations of the worlds.
2. To practice strict adherence to all treaty obligations. and,
3. To demand respect from other nations for British interests (i.e., the British Empire) .127
His approach to diplomacy may be described as cautious; this is illustrated by the following conversation, in which he talked of the difficulties facing a diplomat:
Every step that you take is an irretrievable one, and the consequences of your conduct are immediate and palpable. A false step in such a case cannot be retraced; you cannot, as you do on domestic questions, rescind your policy, calculate the loss you have sustained by the unwise system you have pursued, and console yourselves by thinking that for the future you will shun a policy proved to be injurious. If you make a mistake in your foreign affairs; if you enter into unwise treaties; if you conduct campaigns upon vicious principles; if the scope and tendency of your foreign system are founded upon want of information or false information, or are framed with no clear idea of what are your objects and your means of obtaining them, there is no majority in the House of Commons which can long uphold a Government under such circumstances.128
If his approach was cautious, his manner was forthright, as he said in an 1876 speech:
There is no country so interested in the maintenance of peace as England. Peace is especially an English policy. She is not an aggressive power, for there is nothing which she desires. She covets no cities and no provinces. What she wishes is to maintain and enjoy the unexampled empire which she has built up . . . Although the policy of England is peace, there is no country so well prepared for war as our own. If she enters into conflict in a righteous cause- and I will not believe that England will go to war except in a righteous cause- if the contest is one which concerns her liberty, her independence, or her empire, her resources, I feel, are inexhaustible.129
This was the warning which Disraeli issued to other nations; peace was England's desire, but, if she or her empire were threatened, he would not hesitate to fight for England's rights. Disraeli's practical application of this policy came when, in 1878, Russian designs on European Turkey, the Balkan Peninsula, and her advances toward the Mediterranean were regarded by Disraeli as a threat to the British Empire and its communications. Both nations were determined; Disraeli remarked of the deepening confrontations "We are drifting into war. If we are bold and determined we shall secure peace, and dictate its conditions to Europe. We have to maintain the Empire, and secure peace; I think we can do both..".130
A survey of the European situation in 1878 is provided by George Buckle in the following passage:
Italy was absorbed in internal development, France crushed and helpless, and England (supposedly) wedded to a policy of non-interference .. . they (Russia, Austria, and Germany) framed their policy by themselves first, and demanded the assent of the popularly governed states afterwards. France and Italy seemed for the moment to be willing to accept this dictation; England, under Disraeli, was not.131
As the confrontation deepened, it was an accepted view that a conference among the concerned parties might avert an unnecessary war; it was agreed upon by all the participating nations that the conference be held in Berlin, presided over by the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Hence, the Congress of Berlin came into being, and it has been described by many historians as the "zenith of Beaconsfield's (Disraeli) career".132 Although there were frenzied passions among many Europeans with regard to this situation, the British Prime Minister acted in such a way as to alleviate the growing antagonisms; his "anxiety to avoid war"133 saw successful accomplishment, due primarily to his personal capacities to act as a stable, moderating influence on passionate emotions.134
However, his private tactics at the Conference were not so moderating, at the very outset, Disraeli delivered an ultimatum to the Russians . as he said: "Yielding to Russia what she has obtained (in the Balkans), we say to her, 'Thus far and no farther'. Asia is large enough for both of us. There is no reason for these constant wars, or fears of wars, between Russia and England."135
Disraeli's firm actions, combined with subtle threat, produced swift results. "I have no fear," he said, "about the result, as I have intimated in the proper quarter, that I shall break up the Congress if England's views are not adopted." Coupled with his action to order a special train to take him and the British delegation back to Calais if their demands were not met, the desired effect was produced; Russia backed down and halted her advances. Disraeli's "bold course" had secured success for his foreign policy and had protected England's interests. One of Disraeli's radical opponents in Parliament was so impressed with his diplomatic triumph in Berlin that he remarked: "England now holds as proud a position as she ever held, and this is due to the sagacity, and power, and conduct of the ...person called Benjamin Disraeli."136
Despite his successes in the realms of domestic and foreign policy, the Liberal Opposition, led by William Gladstone, progressively became more critical of the Disraeli Ministry. Most often, the attacks were directed against Disraeli personally; some were even slurs on his character. Queen Victoria was "indignant and shocked" by the behaviour of the Liberals, but Disraeli continued to perform his duties in his usual manner, with the exception that the Opposition's attacks served only to harden his resolution. 137
The years which had preceded Disraeli's first Prime Ministership had seen his attempts to cultivate the favor of the Queen; as Victoria had not forgotten his treatment of Sir Robert Peel in 1846, it was not an easy task. However, Disraeli used flattery and his admiration for her husband, the late Prince Albert, as expedients designed to win the Queen's confidence. Remarkably, these methods were successful; by 1868, Victoria's attitude toward Disraeli had improved so favorably that, upon his accession as Prime Minister, she commented: "Mr. Disraeli is Prime Minister: A proud thing for a Man 'risen from the people' to have obtained! And I must say- really most loyally: it is his real talent, his good temper and the way in which he managed the Reform Bill last year- which have brought this about..."138
The short tenure of his first Ministry saw the development of a strong, intensely intimate relationship between the Sovereign and her Minister; by the time of the second Ministry, Victoria's relations with her Prime Minister were so close that she was often "disgusted with what she held to be the factious and unworthy treatment which he received at the hands of the Opposition."139
Disraeli devotedly wrote to Victoria that "the necessary gulf between a Sovereign and his Minister, is no bar to confidence and sympathy, and, without these qualities, it is difficult to see how public affairs in England can be satisfactorily carried one." 140 Hence, Disraeli did his best to cultivate a harmonious relationship with the Crown during all the years he served as Prime Minister; he also encouraged the Queen to take a more active role in politics, facilitating this by sending her detailed reports of the Cabinet meetings.
As a leader, I feel that Disraeli was guided more by principle than personal greed and ambition. The obstacles which he had faced in his climb to power were too great for a man without strong personal conviction; his devotion to his party, his Queen, and to specific programs, such as social reform, also seem to indicate this. Perhaps, however, there is one area of Disraeli's public career that can illustrate this most readily: his relationship with his Cabinet associates, and his method of governing.
In his relations with his Cabinet colleagues, Disraeli appeared as a promoter of harmony, directing colleagues, but not infringing upon their performance in their official capacities. Historian Robert Blake says: "Disraeli reconciled differences, settled disputes, decided priorities; but he did not initiate, nor did he try to understand the details of measures proposed." 141
For example, in the development of his Ministry's social legislation, he encouraged his colleagues; but, in the working out of the details, he left his subordinates in a position to function on their own.
The following passage best characterizes Disraeli's method of governing:
He was, in matters which interested him, himself the Government . . . But, he had adopted the practice of leaving his colleagues to manage by themselves the conduct of Bills affecting their own departments, and of not interesting himself save at critical moments. A system of ministerial devolution was strictly followed.142
In no way did he ever attempt to be dictatorial, or attempt to portray himself as the man of infinite wisdom who had all the solutions to England's woes. Instead, as George Buckle states:
It became his practice in Cabinet to lay down a policy which he asked his colleagues to support... The firm grip which he kept on the aims of policy was compatible with an unfailing readiness to adopt new means. A man of infinite imagination, he abounded in fresh ideas and novel expedients.143
There are those who differ with this characterization; historian Robert Blake maintains that, "with a united Cabinet, a friendly monarch, a majority in both the Houses of Parliament, and the Opposition in chaos, Disraeli was in a position to carry whatever programme he wished. Having at last obtained power, he had curiously little idea what to do with it..."144
Some historians condemn Disraeli's Ministry for lacking initiative, believing that, in the wake of the massive 1874 electoral victory, he put forth no comprehensive program, nor did he come forth with any positive ideas for such programs. 145 However, those who attempt to detract from the 1874-1880 Disraeli Ministry are overlooking the remarkable successes which he did achieve. Given the proportion of his electoral victory, perhaps it is far too easy for contemporary historians to feel that more accomplishments were in order; however, if one judges his accomplishments in relation to the standards of achievement of other nineteenth century Ministries, there is not a one that measures up to the success which the second Disraeli Ministry produced.
Above all, one must remember that the venerable statesman was over seventy
years old when the British electorate catapulted him into the Prime Ministership.
As he said on the occasion: "Power: it has come to me too late. There were
days when, on waking, I felt that I could move dynasties and governments;
but that has passed away." 146
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
"It is the destiny of the weak to be devoured by the strong" 147; this was the view of the cold, calculating, self-seeking man who harbored a brazen attitude toward the German people and toward other nations. Such attitudes may have been responsible for creating a pervasive national mood that would result in the blatant neglect of the rights of small nations such as Belgium; they may also have been responsible for the German militarism that frightened the world in 1914 and 1938.
However, all of this is purely speculative on the part of historians; when trying to draw a conclusion about the Bismarckian years, one fact, readily apparent, is that the Iron Chancellor employed many deplorable methods while achieving his goals. By proposing universal suffrage. he had hoped to ally the German populace to his government; by encouraging Italian nationalism, he had incited nationalistic passions and dissent within the Hapsburg Empire. Time and again, he threatened to turn the forces of nationalism against
the governments of France, Austria, or Russia. 148 As Otto Pflanze notes: "Bismarck was prepared to unleash forces which he recognized were beyond his power to control. He stood poised, match in hand, over the powder keg of national revolution." 149
One can share an admiration for the achievements of the German Chancellor; however, in assessing the accomplishments of Bismarck's policies, one must also weigh their consequences.
Despite the fact that he was able to gain through quick, lightening wars, objects which would normally have taken years to acquire, his provocation of war is impardonable. His years of rule saw him violate the Prussian constitution, defy the Prussian National Assembly overthrow the rightful rulers of the small German states, abrogate the constitutional rights of citizens; and suspend freedom of the press.
One notable result of his rule was that educated Germans responded obediently, without question, to hierarchal commands; the spirit of authoritarianism, which Bismarck exemplified, was imitated by others, and it became irreparably ingrained in German politickl. life.150 As historian William H. Dawson adds:
The spirit and methods which he introduced into the political life . . . did much to pervert the moral sense of his countrymen and to lower the standard of public right in Europe.151
There is the fact that all of the powers of state were concentrated in the hands of one man; without debating the possibilities that the inaccountability of his position may have produced a virtual dictatorship, it is an uncontested fact that, because of Bismarck's monopolization of power, the German bureaucracy was totally devoid of any officials who could replace him, and who could adequately carry on the business of the German government when he resigned. However, as historian William H. Dawson states:
His nation will never forget or seek to diminish the greatness of the services which he rendered to its unity. He did great things while other people were talking about them; schemes so bold that his fellow mortals grasped them only as ideas, he held before their bewildered eyes as finished facts. The Empire had been in the making for half a century before he came to power; it was he who finally drew together the sundered peoples and welded their irresolute longings into a mighty will for union.152
The Bismarckian system instilled authoritarianism in Germany; it produced a weak bureaucracy; it left an army independent of any civilian control; it circumvented almost any degree of parliamentary control; but, it did produce a unified and prosperous German state, and twenty years of peace in Europe.
Politically, Bismarck was totally "out of sympathy"153 with the type of political life that existed in England. There, a parliamentary-type government ruled the country through its legislation; two thriving political parties competed against each other for control of the parliament, and appealed to the British electorate for support, based upon the programs which they espoused; the economy was prospering under Free Trade and other liberal economic policies; a religious policy of toleration for Catholics was maintained in a predominantly Protestant country; and, most importantly, guarantees of personal freedoms and civil rights had been derived from the time-honored precedents of an unwritten constitution.
In marked contrast to Bismarck's divisive policies and domestic persecutions, the years of Disraeli's public service saw the followings
1. Class harmony and co-operation, due primarily to the social legislation which he had supported;
2. A consolidation of the British Empire, and a strengthening of her position abroad; and,
3. The preservation and extension of British institutions and rights. Disraeli was a man who had made his reputation as a political historian; his literary works expounded his beliefs to the British public. As a theoretician, he had kept his beliefs in the forefront of the British political arena for almost four decades before he finally received the acceptance which he had desired: victory at the polls. His main strength lay in his debating capacities, and his extraordinary ability to stir a parliamentary body to applause. One contemporary account of his great oratorical skills states:
No one can form any idea of his powers. His speeches when read give no adequate idea of their effect. The impression made on an emotional assembly like the House of Commons can never be put into print. The varying sensations, fluctuating like the breast of the ocean; the minute rhetorical effects, which moved his audiences so powerfully; the alterations of voice; the pauses; the grand gestures, he had the proud consciousness of having a master mind, a masterly power of influence over men...154
From his first day in Parliament, Disraeli recognized the strengths which he possessed, and also the socio-economic weaknesses which would prejudice the opinions of many against him. Early in his career, he had written to his sisters, "Between ourselves, I could floor them all. I was never more confident of anything than that I could carry everything before me in that House."155 But, it took thirty-six years of devotion to the party, and the enduring of many insults before he was to finally gain acceptance for himself and his ideas, and "to carry everything before me in that House..."; as he himself noted:
It is a very difficult country to move, a very difficult country indeed, and one in which there is more disappointment to be looked for than success.156
The years from 1874 to 1880 are filled with much that can be analyzed; after all considerations, the final judgment is extremely favorable. His administration produced great social achievement at home, and respect for England abroad. His personal respect for the traditions of English politics, and the concern for bettering the conditions of Englishmen are two highly admirable qualities; unlike Bismarck, his achievements can be admired along with the methods which he used to produce them.
Near the end of his life, Disraeli said of his long career:
Not insensible to the principle of progress, I have endeavored to reconcile change with that respect of tradition which is one of the main elements of our social strength; and in external affairs I have endeavored to develop and strengthen our Empire, believing that combination of achievement and responsibility elevate the character and condition of a people.157
The great question of Disraeli's truth in his motives was originally examined by historian William F. Monypenny:
How far was he in earnest, how far was he true in his motive; disinterested in his aims, of moral rectitude of character? That in Disraeli there was from the beginning a certain worship of self, not so much in a small or merely selfish sense, but with something that was sincere and almost artistic in the motive; and this self-worship was often in conflict with the surrender to a great purpose which we associate with the highest greatness. Yet it is easy to exaggerate the importance of self. There is always something impersonal in genius. In Disraeli's case the political genius of the man often drove him on regardless of self, and equally regardless of the consciously moral motives of lesser men, and gave to his character an elevation and a i0f abandonment almost in his own despite.158
In a final analysis, one must agree that Otto von Bismarck accomplished much for Germany; yet, it was accomplished in such a way as to prove unlasting. There was much that can be admired, but there was also much that was deplorable.
Disraeli, too, achieved many notable successes. Though his tenure in office does not nearly compare to that of Bismarck, his years were remarkably free of acts for which we can condemn him.
It would probably be safe to say that both of these men were products of their political environment; both acted as they did primarily because of the political climate and institutions which surrounded them, respectively. Bismarck created his environment almost single-handedly, and he ran it single-handedly for twenty years thereafter; conversely, Disraeli inherited a position which was bound by the traditions and precedents of his political environment.
I would not presume to pass final judgment on the moral characters of either of these gentleman, feeling that, because of their very different political environments, they were motivated to act as they deemed necessary in specific situations. The context of one given situation cannot be transposed on another: what might seem immoral in one instance may be perfectly acceptable in another.
The only evaluation which I will impose on both of these men is the
same one which Disraeli once passed on Sir Robert Peel: "He was an opportunist,
but politicians have to be ..."159
1 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Preface.
2 Koppel Pinson, Mode German.(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1954), p. 48.
3 Ibid., p. 222.
4 Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1950), p. 75.
5 Ibid. , p.12.
6 Ibid., p. 57.
7 Ibid., p. 62.
8 Edward Clarke, Benjami Disraeli.-(London: John Murray, 1926), p. 162.
9 William F. Monypenny and George E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraelit VI (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1920), pp. 451-52.
10 Pflanze, p. 58.
11 Ibid., p. 275.
12 Eyck, p. 88.
13 Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck:The Man and the Statesman, (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1899), I, p. 62.
14 Eyck, p. 94.
15.Ibid , p. 220.
16 Ibid,.p. 164.
17 Ibid., p. 132.
18 A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1905), p. 23
19 Pflanze, p. 177.
20 Pinson, p. 132.
21 Eyck, p. 265.
22 William H. Dawson, The German Empire 1867-1914 and the Unity Movement (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1919) , I, p.274.
23 Ibid. , p. 266.
24 Ibid.,. p. 272.
25 Jbid., p. 274.
26 Ibid., p. 276.
27 Pflanze, p. 223.
28 Ibid., . p. 360.
29 Eyck, p. 188.
30 Dawson, I., p. 395.
31 Richard Levine Benjamin Disrael- (New York:Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 8
32 Ibid., p.25.
33 Ibid., p. 24.
34 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
35 Andre Maurois, Disraeli: A Picture Of the Victorian Age (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1928), p. 172.
36 Levine, p. 159.
37 Ibid., p. 87.
38 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
39 Maurois, p. 86.
40 Monypenny and Buckle, I, p. 89.
41 Ibid., II, p. 267.
42 Ibid., p. 295.
43 Ibid., p. 250.
44 Ibid., p. 299.
45 Ibid., p. 228.
46 Maurois, p. 86.
47 Monypenny and Buckle, II, p. 230.
48 Clarke, p. 78.
49 Monypenny and Buckle, II, p. 40.
50 Ibid., p. 387.
51 Robert Blake, Disraeli (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1966), p. 227.
52 Clarke, p. 83.
53 Blake, p. 277.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 278.
56 Monypenny and Buckle, III, p. 77.
57 Pflanze, p. 183.
58 Veit Valentin,"Bismarck's Political Technique,"Conteporary Review,July 1938, p. 64.
59 C. Grant Robertsong, Bismarck (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919), p. 94.
60 Pflanze, p 298.
61 Ibid., p. 14.
62 Valentin, p.67.
63 Gordon A. Craig, "Devoted Opportunist," Saturday Review, 9 November 1955, P. 35.
64 Robertson, p. 109.
65 Eyck, p. 174.
66 Pflanze, p. 134.
67 Ibid., p. 91.
68 Ibid., p. 90.
69 Ibid., p. 245.
70 Ibid., p. 198.
71 Robertson, p. 100.
72 Ibid., p. 126.
73 Ibid., p. 302.
74 Valentin, p, 66.
75 Dawson, p. 391.
76 Bismarck, II, p. 42.
77 Ibid., p. 48.
78 Dawson, II, p.10.
79 Pflanze, p. 277.
80 Dawson, I, pp. 431-433.
81 Ibid., pp. 439-441.
82 Dawson, II, p. 48.
83 Bismarck, II, p. 164.
84 Dawson, I, p. 479.
85 Sidney B. Fay, "Bismarck's Welfare State,"Current History, January 1950, pp. 2-3.
86 Dawson, II, p. 46.
87 Pflanze, p. 299.
88 Dawson, II, pp. 6-15.
89 Bismarck, II, p. 66.
90 Ibid., p. 169.
91 Ibid., p.171.
92 Ibid., p. 2.
93 Ibid., p. 215.
94 Maurois, p. 285.
95 Harold J. Laski, "Disraeli's Democracy," New Republic,18 November 1916, p. 30.
96 Monypenny and Buckle, VI, p. 642.
97"English Public Lifep" Edinburgh Review, July 1911, p. 215.
98 Monypenny and Buckle, III, p. 290.
99 Ibid., IV, p. 126.
100 Ibid., p. 103.
101 Ibid.,V, p. 190.
102 Blake, p. 482.
103 Monypenny and Buckle, IV, p. 563.
104 Ibid., p. 126.
105 Ibid., p. 424.
106 Ibid., pp. 192-193.
107 Ibid., p. 210.
108 Ibid., p. 2.
109 Blake, p. 764.
110 Monypenny and Buckle, IV, p.1.
111 Ibid., V, p. 194.
112 Ibid., p. 252.
113 Ibid., IV, p. 241.
114 Ibid., V, p.291.
115 Ibid., I, p. 229.
116 Ibid., V, p. 275.
117 Ibid., p. 138.
118 Ibid., V, p.149.
119 Ibid., p. 172.
120 Ibid., p. 184.
121 Ibid., p. 276.
122 Ibid., p. 289.
123 Ibid., pp. 298-99.
124 Ibid., p. 351.
125 Ibid., VI, p. 37.
126 Blake, p. 553.
127 Monypenny and Buckle, V, p. 406.
128 Ibid., IV, p. 9.
129 Ibid., VI, p. 92.
130 Ibid., p. 261.
131 Ibid., p. 368.
132 Ibid., p. 310.
133 Ibid., p. 421.
134 Ibid., p. 119.
135 Ibid., p. 354.
136 Ibid., p. 312.
137 Ibid., p. 241.
138 Blake, p. 487.
139 Monypenny and Buckle, V, p. 47.
140 Ibid., p. 418.
141 Blake, p.543.
142 Monypenny and Buckle, V, p. 370.
143 Ibid., VI, p. 546.
144 Blake, p. 549.
145 Edwin M. Yoder,"Victorian Party Man," Saturday Reviewt 4 March 1967, P. 30.
146 Monypenny and Buckle, V, p. 299.
147 Eyck, pp.- 159-160.
148 Pflanze, p. 306.
149 Ibid., p. 308.
150 Louis Snyder, "Doubt Came Too Late for Germany," Saturday Review, 3 April 1965, p. 40.
151 Dawson, II, p. 265.
152 Ibid., p. 254.
153 Ibid., p. 164.
154 Monypenny and Buckle, V, p. 505.
155 Ibid., p. 510.
156 Blake, p. 764.
157 Monypenny and Buckle, V, p. 518.
158 Ibid.,VI, p. 641.
159 Blake, p.765.
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